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Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corporations:
Is Bank Monitoring the Answer?
Corinne A. Franzen
It is widely believed that managers of corporations in the
United States generally pursue short-term growth strategies.'
What is less understood are the forces that constrain these cor-
porate managers and shape their decisions. The predominant
reason cited for the perceived "short-sighted" approach of many
U.S. corporations is that investors in the United States demand
continuous improvement in short-term earnings. U.S. investors
require short-term earnings because stock ownership is inher-
ently risky, and U.S. investors have little or no access to corpo-
rate information which might mitigate that risk.2 One result is
that U.S. corporations have a high equity cost of capital which
impacts their long-term strategies by making investment in re-
search and development more expensive.3 Thus, the result of
the high equity cost of capital in the United States is that U.S.
corporations lack sufficient access to the long-term capital nec-
essary to finance new plants and equipment and to support re-
search and inventories which will lead to increased long-term
1. A recent international survey ranked business firms of twenty-three
nations on their ability "to take the long view." Lester Thurow, Let's Learn
from the Japanese, FORTUNE, Nov. 18, 1991, at 183. The survey ranked U.S.
firms twenty-second, ahead only of Hungarian firms. Id
2. See infra text accompanying notes 145-51.
3. Corporations often use net present value analysis in determining
whether to pursue a project. Net present value (NPV) is defined as the dis-
counted value of all cash inflows less the discounted value of all cash outflows.
The value of future cash inflows diminishes as the discount rate (expectations
of risk and inflation) rises. If the NPV is positive, the corporation can conclude
that the rate of return on the project is greater than the corporation's cost of
capital. Investment in research and development is often a long-term project,
demanding large cash outflows in the short term and providing cash inflows
only over the long-term. Especially when interest rates are high, cash outflows
are likely to exceed inflows; therefore, a corporation's decision to invest in re-
search and development is a difficult one, because a high discount rate means
that the investment has to result in enormous future cash inflows to make the
investment worthwhile. See generally WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE,
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
280-297 (4th ed. 1990).
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international competitiveness. 4
Corporations in other countries, particularly Japan and Ger-
many, do not face the same deficiency in long-term capital, to a
large extent because those countries allow banks to own stock in
and to monitor corporations.5 The banks, as corporate "insid-
ers," have access to information about the corporation and its
long-range plans, which decreases their risk of investment.
Moreover, the banks, particularly in their role as lenders, prefer
a strategy which emphasizes the continued vitality of the com-
pany. Thus, it is cost effective and profitable for banks to closely
monitor the actions of the corporation. The result is that the
major investors in Japan and Germany do not demand continu-
ous improvement in short-term earnings, and corporations are
able to make the long-term decisions needed to maintain or in-
crease competitiveness in the international marketplace.
In the United States the Glass-Steagall Act 6 tightly restricts
bank ownership of corporations, and U.S. banks, unlike their
German and Japanese counterparts, are prohibited from domi-
nating corporate boards. 7 This difference is significant because
bank ownership and monitoring of corporations appears to de-
crease the cost of capital, allowing corporate managers to adopt a
long-term view, which results in increased international
competitiveness.
This Note examines whether the United States could in-
crease the long-term competitiveness of U.S. firms in the inter-
national marketplace by modifying the Glass-Steagall Act's
current prohibition on bank control, thereby alleviating the
pressure caused by short-term measures of performance.8 Part I
examines corporate governance as it currently exists in the
United States, and compares it with corporate governance in Ja-
4. See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-
TERM GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 7 (1988).
5. See generally discussion infra text accompanying notes 105-29.
6. The Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 78, 377, 378 (Supp. II 1990)). This act prohibits banks
from directly owning and underwriting any common stock. Id. The Glass-Stea-
gall Act consists of four sections of the Banking Act of 1933 (§§ 16, 20, 21 and
32). 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) Under § 21 of the
Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378, individuals and organizations engaged in invest-
ment banking may not receive deposits. Correspondingly, § 16 of the Banking
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24, bars a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System
from dealing in or underwriting securities.
7. Id
8. This Note will not address other significant issues of corporate govern-
ance, including shareholders rights and the duties the board has toward its
shareholders.
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pan and Germany. This comparison specifically focuses on the
means by which corporate management is monitored in each of
the countries and the role that banks play in that process. Part
II examines the hypothesis and causes of "short-termism" 9 in
the United States, discusses how bank monitoring in Japan and
Germany reduces pressures on managers to pursue short-term
strategies, and considers the impact which proposed banking re-
forms may have on corporate monitoring in the United States.
Part III concludes that a modification of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which would permit banks to own stock in and to monitor corpo-
rations in the United States, would decrease the equity cost of
capital for investment. The decrease in equity cost, in turn,
would allow for expanded research and development and result
in increased long-term international competitiveness.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW
An examination of the socio-political context of corporate
and general business practices in the United States, Japan and
Germany provides a basis for understanding the role of corpo-
rate monitoring in each country.10 The following discussion con-
centrates on the identity and effectiveness of the corporate
monitors in each country and demonstrates that banks in Japan
and Germany are able to monitor and control corporations to a
much greater extent than the fragmented individual and institu-
tional shareholders in the United States.
A. UNITED STATES
Corporate management in the United States is monitored by
diverse shareholders and market forces. Neither has proven ca-
pable of providing an incentive for corporate management to
forego short-term profits in return for market share and long-
term growth. Dispersed shareholders in the United States pro-
vide the capital needs of large publicly-held companies, neces-
sarily separating ownership from control of these companies.,
Individual shareholders rarely hold large blocks of stock, and
9. Michael T. Jacobs defines "short-termism" as "[a] preoccupation with
short-term results and instant economic gratification." MICHAEL T. JACOBS,
SHORT-TERM AMERICA 7 (1991).
10. "Corporate monitor" or "monitor" will be used throughout this Article
to describe the individual shareholders and/or institutional investors which
take an active interest in the affairs or management of a corporation.
11. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10 (1991).
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the capacity of each stockholder to exert control over corporate
actions becomes more limited as the number of stockholders in-
creases. 12 Thus, corporate wealth is held by most shareholders
as a "passive investment," allowing managers to control the day-
to-day affairs of the corporation and make fundamental deci-
sions without any intervention or significant pressure from the
true owners of the corporation.13 The normal outlet for share-
holders to express their displeasure with corporate decision-
making is to sell their interest rather than take an active inter-
est in the management of a company, or to institute actions to
influence or replace management. 14 Thus, corporate managers
in the United States are not directly monitored and controlled
by shareholders; rather, they are controlled by the market and
by the threat of takeover in the event they are not maximizing
asset potential.15
1. The Glass-Steagall Act
The U.S. system of separate ownership and control over cor-
porations is the result of laws passed in response to the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Prior to the 1930s, the United States
had bank-centered business groups very similar to those now
found in Germany and Japan.16 U.S. bankers typically held
seats on their customers' boards, owned their stock, and fre-
12. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967).
13. Roe, supra note 11, at 12.
14. James E. Heard, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance:
The U.S. Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245, 251 (Jo-
seph C.F. Lufkin & David Gallagher eds., 1990). Investors can protect their in-
terests at less expense by selling their shares in enterprises that are
inefficiently managed and switching their resources to better-managed compa-
nies. This principle of investor behavior has been called the "Wall Street Rule."
Id. The problem underlying the Wall Street Rule is that individuals who take
an active interest in the affairs or management of a company are giving a "free
ride" to the rest of the shareholders, who own the remaining stock. LOWEN-
STEIN, supra note 4, at 252. See also Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism:
Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 144-45 (1988). Conard argues
that although the Wall Street Rule fits a typical individual investor, it may not
be a pervasive principle of conduct among institutional investors. Id. at 145.
For a discussion of the expanding role of institutional investors, see infra note
34.
15. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, J.
ECON. LITERATURE, Mar. 1990, at 1, 16. For a discussion of takeovers, see infra
text accompanying notes 130-44.
16. For example, the House of Morgan was a group that included U.S.
Steel, International Harvester, General Electric, and 37 other American firms.
LESTER C. THuROw, HEAD TO HEAD, 135-36 (1992).
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quently consulted with senior management about long-term
strategies and short-term operating plans.17 U.S. banking and
securities laws during this time, however, were permissive and
banks, due to their enormous influence, were able to manipulate
certain companies.' 8 Congress attributed the failure of a large
number of banks during the Depression to these activities, 19 and
reacted by passing the Glass-Steagall Act.2 0 This act banned
banks from underwriting corporate securities or owning equity
in nonfinancial companies. 21 The Glass-Steagall Act was Con-
gress' response to charges against some banks of conflict of in-
terest and fraud, and the fear of banks taking similar risks with
depositor money after the stock market collapse and during the
Great Depression.22 Section 16 prevents a bank from underwrit-
ing, distributing, selling, or dealing in investment securities, ex-
cept on its own account.23 Section 20 bars banks from affiliating
with any company engaged principally in underwriting securi-
ties.24 Section 21 makes it unlawful for investment banks to ac-
17. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 143.
18. Id at 144. Examples of such manipulation include: bankers loaning
money to customers to purchase equities sold by the bank's own securities de-
partments, often at inflated prices; banks purchasing overvalued stocks from
their securities affiliates to place in customers' trust accounts; and banks raising
money for their customers by selling stock whose proceeds were used to pay off
outstanding bank loans before a company failed. Id.
19. Approximately 5,000 banks failed between 1929 and 1933. Frank M.
Tavelman, American Banks or the Glass-Steagall Act - Which Will Go First?,
21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
20. The Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 377, 378 (Supp. II 1990)).
21. Id.
22. 138 CONG. REC. E2877-02, E2878 (1992). The Banking Act was passed
"[t]o provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks .... to
prevent undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other pur-
poses." Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat., at 162. See also Tavelman, supra
note 19, at 1511.
23. Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall
be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and
in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite
any issue of securities or stock; Provided, that the association may
purchase for its own account investment securities under such limita-
tions and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regu-
lation prescribe.
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, at 185 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. II 1990)) (emphasis in original). See also § 5(c), 12
U.S.C. § 335 (1982) (§ 16 limitations apply to state member banks).
24. Section 20 states in pertinent part: "[No member bank shall be affili-
ated in any manner . . . with any corporation, association, business trust, or
other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwrit-
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cept deposits,2 5 and section 32 prohibits any officer or director of
a commercial bank from managing a company engaged primar-
ily in the securities business.2 6 Some banks attempted to cir-
cumvent these restrictions by forming holding companies; but
Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act27 in 1956,
which prohibited bank-owned companies from engaging in "non-
banking" activities.28 Congress also passed laws limiting pension
funds and mutual funds to the ownership of only ten percent of
the stock of any one company.29
The passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, however, has not cre-
ated an impenetrable barrier between commercial and invest-
ment banks. First, not all banks are affected by the act. State-
chartered banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve
System are not subject to the prohibitions of the act, and Glass-
Steagall does not apply to the overseas activities of U.S. banks.3°
Second, banks are not completely prohibited from engaging in
investment activities. Banks can buy or sell securities on behalf
of customers as long as they do so without providing investment
advice, and are able to underwrite debt instruments of the fed-
eral government and general obligation mutual bonds.31 Even
more significantly, bank affiliates can engage in otherwise pro-
ing, public sale, or distribution... of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other
securities." Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, at 188 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)).
25. Section 21 provides in pertinent part, that it is unlawful
(flor any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other
similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate par-
ticipation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities, to en-
gage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation
of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request of the depositor ....
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 21, 48 Stat. 162, at 189 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1988)).
26. Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits directors, officers, or em-
ployees of banks from simultaneously holding similar positions at firms "pri-
marily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution
... [of] securities." Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 32, 48 Stat. 162, at 194 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)).
27. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §§ 4(c)(6)-(7), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988). See also infra note 37.
28. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §§ 4(c)(6)-(7), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988). See also JACOBS, supra note 9, at 144-45.
29. See infra note 35. See also THUROW, supra note 16, at 135-36.
30. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991. H.R.
REP. No. 157 (IV), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1991).
31. Id
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hibited activities so long as they are not "principally engaged" in
them.32 However, even though Glass-Steagall has not created animpenetrable barrier between commercial and investment
banks, no interpretation of Glass-Steagall allows U.S. banks to
own significant amounts of stock in corporations.
2. Institutional Investors
Institutional investors33 own a significant percentage of
stock in U.S. corporations; 34 however, the potential for effective
32. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184, at 188 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)), prohibits national banks or state member
banks of the Federal Reserve System from owning securities affiliates, defined
in § 2(b), 48 Stat. 162, that are "engaged principally" in the issuance or under-
writing of securities. See supra note 24. On several occasions the courts have
reviewed the Board of Governors interpretation of "engaged principally." In
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Institute, 450
U.S. 46 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the Board of Governors decision to
permit bank holding companies to act as investment advisers for closed-end in-
vestment companies. This decision was based on the court's understanding that
"[i]nvestment advisers and closed-end investment companies are not 'princi-
pally engaged' in the issuance or the underwriting of securities within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act .... " Id at 71. In Securities Industry Ass'n
v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir., 1988),
the court upheld the Board's interpretation of "engaged principally" in § 20 as
precluding bank ownership of affiliates whose securities business is substantial,
measured by revenue and market share limits. Affiliates whose underwriting
or dealing in securities is a regular or integral part of the affiliates' business, but
is not substantial, are not precluded by the Act. Id In Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 716 F.2d 92, (2nd Cir.,
1983), affd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984), the court held that a bank holding company
may acquire a brokerage firm because a brokerage business does not constitute
a "public sale" of securities under § 20, thus the bank holding company would
not be "engaged principally" in the public sale of securities.
Section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits directors, officers, or employ-
ees of banks from simultaneously holding similar positions at firms "primarily
engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution... [of]
securities .... ." 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982) (emphasis added). In Board of Governors
of Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), the Supreme Court
held that an activity or function is "primary" if it is a substantial activity or
function of the firm. "An activity or function may be "primary" in that sense if
it is substantial. If the underwriting business of a firm is substantial, the firm is
engaged in the underwriting business in a primary way, though by any quantita-
tive test underwriting may not be its chief or principal activity." 329 U.S. at 446.
33. Institutional investors include pension funds (both private and public),
investment companies, insurance companies, bank non-pension trusts, and
foundations and endowments. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in
the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 362 (1990).
34. "In 1980, institutions held 33 percent of all publicly quoted American
shares. [In 1991].... they are believed to own 45 percent." Roberta S. Karmel,
Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 68 (1991). See
also Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
1993]
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corporate monitoring by institutional investors in the United
States is limited by tight restrictions on their ability to own a
significant percentage of stock in any one corporation.35 Banks,
as noted above, are prohibited from directly owning and under-
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 16 (1991). Moreover, institu-
tional assets are heavily concentrated. "In 1989, institutions held 50 percent of
the stock in the top fifty public corporations, 56.5 percent in the top 51-100, and
54.2 percent in the top 101-250." Karmel, supra, at 68. Among the institutions,
pension funds are the largest holders. Sommer, supra note 33, at 361. "By the
end of 1989, pension funds owned an estimated 25-40 percent of publicly traded
equities and they could own 50 percent by the year 2000." Karmel, supra, at 68.
See also John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1355 (1992).
"At the end of 1988, the top thirty public and private pension funds held ap-
proximately 27.3 percent of the asset value of all such funds and 39.6 percent of
the assets of the thousand largest funds." Karmel, supra at 68.
35. Stock ownership by mutual funds is restricted by the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 which provides that a mutual fund cannot advertise itself as
diversified if the regulated part of its portfolio owns more than 10% of the stock
of any company, even if that stock is a small portion of the fund's portfolio.
Investment Company Act of 1940, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988) [hereinafter
1940 Act]. The "regulated" part of the portfolio is three-quarters of the portfo-
lio, only one-quarter is unregulated. Id. The 1940 Act also prohibits a "diversi-
fied" mutual fund from placing more than 5% of its regulated assets in the
securities of any one issuer. 1940 Act, supra, § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1)
(1988). Mutual funds are encouraged to be "diversified" by considerable tax
penalties for non-diversified funds. See Roe, supra note 11, at 19-20. Mutual
fund assets in 1993 stand at $1.6 trillion, compared with less than $50 billion in
1977. Jeffrey M. Laderman & Geoffrey Smith, The Power of Mutual Funds,
Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 62.
Stock ownership by insurance companies is restricted by the laws of the
state in which the policy is sold. See Roe, supra note 11, at 23. In New York,
20% of a life insurer's assets, or one-half of its surplus, can go into stock. N.Y.
Ins. Law § 1405(a)(6), (8). See Roe, supra note 11, at 22. However, an insurance
company cannot take influential blocks because New York laws limit insurance
companies to placing 2% of their assets into the stock of any single issuer, and
property and casualty insurers cannot control a non-insurance company. Id. at
22-23. Other states have similar rules. Id.
Pension funds are the least regulated institutional investor. Id at 23. How-
ever, stock ownership by pension funds is restricted by their limited assets and
fragmentation. Id.
[E]ach company typically sets up its own fund, often giving money to
several managers, who receive money from several companies. Since
ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) gener-
ally requires each fund to be diversified, there is little room for an in-
fluential position in an operating company. ERISA allows deviation
from diversification only if 'clearly prudent' not [to minimize] the risk
of large losses.'
Id. at 24 (quoting ERISA § 104(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(1)(c) (1988)). Moreover,
pension managers are hired and controlled by a plan sponsor's management,
and risk angering their own company's senior management if they take an ac-
tive role. Id. at 24.
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writing any common stock by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.1
The Bank Holding Company Act prevents bank holding compa-
nies from owning more than five percent of the voting stock of
any operating nonbanking company, unless the additional stock
is nonvoting.3 7 Bank trust departments are not restricted in
stock ownership and may invest up to ten percent of their funds
in the stock of a single corporation.3 8 Thus, although national
banks may not directly own equity securities for their own bene-
fit, bank holding companies, bank trust companies, and other in-
stitutional investors may own equity securities for their own
benefit, to a limited extent.3 9
B. JAPAN
Corporate management in Japan is monitored by banks and
voluntary groupings of corporations which effectively monitor
36. The Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 78, 377, 378 (Supp. II 1990)). See John Eckhouse, The
Three Faces of Capitalism: US., Japanese, German Systems Vie for
Supremacy, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 1990, at C1.
37. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §§4(c)(6)-(7), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988) (amended 1970). Under this statute, bank holding com-
panies have been authorized to own up to 25% of the nonvoting stock of a non-
banking corporation. Bank holding companies cannot otherwise control an
industrial firm. Moreover, the Bank Holding Company Act permits banks to
acquire businesses whose activities are "so closely related to banking... as to be
a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1297 n.153 (1991). See also Bernard S. Black, Share-
holder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 520, 551-53 (1990). See also Roe,
supra note 11, at 18 n.28. A determination that an activity is "closely related" is
based on whether:
(i) banks generally do in fact conduct the proposed activity; (ii) banks
generally provide services that are so operationally or functionally sim-
ilar to the proposed activity that they are particularly well-equipped to
provide them; or (iii) banks generally provide services that are so inte-
grally related to the proposed service as to require their provision in a
specialized form.
Deborah S. Prutzman, Selected Issues Relating to Securities Activities of Bank-
ing Institutions, in Banking Law Series, at 179, 183-84 (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 600, 1992). In effect, essentially any ma-
jor bank may legally acquire up to 5% of the voting stock of an industrial corpo-
ration through a parent or securities affiliate. Coffee, supra, at 1313 n.153.
38. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(9)(ii) (1991). See Coffee, supra note 37, at n.153. See
also Roe, supra note 11, at 18.
39. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1315 n.156. However, one author has argued
that even if bank holding companies and bank trust companies were able to
purchase a large stake, the prohibition on direct bank control limits what the
bank can do with a large stake, and thus reduces incentives to acquire such a
stake. See Black, supra note 37, at 552.
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and encourage each other to pursue a long-term focus.4° Banks
in Japan face regulations similar to those found in the United
States. For example, under Section 65 of Japan's Securities and
Exchange Act of 1948,41 a Japanese bank may not engage in in-
vestment banking.42 Under section 11 of Japan's Anti-Monopoly
Act,43 a Japanese bank may not own more than five percent of
the stock of any domestic corporation." In practice, however,
these restrictions have been unsuccessful due to the formation
of voluntary economic coalitions of firms and financial institu-
tions known as keiretsu.45 Japanese culture emphasizes the
group, rather than the individual, as the key social entity.46
This emphasis is one explanation for the ability of keiretsu to
exert control over corporations in Japan.47
Until 1945, much of Japan's economy was controlled by
large family-owned, bank-centered conglomerates of interre-
lated industrial, financial, and commercial enterprises known as
40. THUROW, supra note 16, at 134.
41. Shoken torihikiho (Securities Exchange Law), § 65, Law No. 25 of 1948,
cited in Coffee, supra note 37, at 1294 n.60.
42. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1294 nn.60-62. A measure passed in 1992 re-
laxed the provisions of Article 65 by allowing banks to set up separately capital-
ised and managed subsidiaries to do a limited amount of securities business.
Japanese Securities Firms; Banker's Embrace, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 88.
43. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru
horitsu (An act regarding the prohibition of private monopolies and the mainte-
nance of fair trade), § 11(a), Law No. 54 of 1947, cited in Coffee, supra note 37,
at 1294 n. 61.
44. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1294 nn.60-62. See also Charles H. Ferguson,
Computers and the Coming of the U.S. Keiretsu, HARVARD Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1990, at 55, 58. Financial institutions as a whole own about 40% of the stock
outstanding of listed companies. Aoki, supra note 15, at 14.
45. Keiretsu means "economic group." Coffee, supra note 37, at 1214. See
also CLYDE V. PRESTOWrz, JR., TRADING PLACES 157 (1988). There are six
bank-centered keiretsu in Japan: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Dai-Ichi
Kangyo, Fuyo, and Sanwa. Japan: Experts Urge Enforcement of Antitrust
Laws in U.S. Against Keiretsu System, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1663 (Nov. 13,
1991) [hereinafter Experts Urge Enforcement].
46. PREsTowrrz, supra note 45, at 82. Groups define a person's existence in
Japan; conformity, group ethics, and ningen kankei (close human ties) are
stressed as worthwhile virtues. Id at 82-86.
47. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quiquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 219
(1991). The six major keiretsu in Japan, see supra note 45, account for roughly
17% of the sales of all Japanese business and roughly 18% of the profits, exclud-
ing the results of banking and insurance. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 45, at 157.
Each group contains companies in each major area of the Japanese economy.
Id.
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zaibatsu.48 The U.S. Occupation forces in Japan broke up the
zaibatsu; but, after the end of the Occupation, they were reas-
sembled into the keiretsu, a looser regrouping of the former
zaibatsu interests.49 While the zaibatsu were directly controlled
through family holding companies, the keiretsu are based
around core banks and trading companies.50 Each keiretsu typi-
cally consists of an association of companies and a "main bank"
which serves as their chief source of financing.5' The main bank
in a keiretsu is usually both a significant shareholder 2 and the
principal creditor of the keiretsu members, 3 and is responsible
for closely monitoring their business affairs. 4 Unlike individual
investors in the United States, it is cost-effective and profitable
for the bank to closely monitor the corporation because the bank
is both a shareholder and has a large loan share. In the normal
course of events, the bank does not exert control in corporate
policymaking or the selection of management; however, in a
business crisis, the bank assumes major responsibility for rescue
operations. 55 The keiretsu enable companies to share riskse and
provide a mechanism for allocating investment.57 The groups
48. Id. at 156-57. The four largest zaibatsu were Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Id.
49. Id. at 157. See also Coffee, supra note 37, at 1295.
50. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 45, at 157.
51. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1295-96. Between 20% and 40% of Japanese
firms use main banks. Japan: Japan's Annual Economic 'White Paper' Notes
Changes, Says System at Crossroads, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1341 (Aug. 5,
1992) [hereinafter System at Crossroads].
52. A recent study reports that, on average, a Japanese company's largest
debtholder owned 6.2% of the company's equity; that the five largest
debtholders owned 18.2% of the equity; and that out of 133 companies surveyed,
the largest debtholder was the largest shareholder in 57 cases or was a member
of the same keiretsu as the largest shareholder in an additional 67 cases. Coffee,
supra note 37, at 1295 n.66.
53. Id.
54. Aoki, supra note 15, at 14. Businesses maintain long-term ties with the
banks, often make deposits when the banks need them, sell bonds through the
banks, and often purchase the bank's shares to establish solid cross-sharehold-
ing relationships. System at Crossroads, supra note 51, at 1341. This close rela-
tionship has been blamed for a series of banking scandals over the past two
years. Id.
55. Rescue operations may include the rescheduling of loan payments and
emergency loans. Aoki, supra note 15, at 14. For example, Sumitomo Bank,
Ltd. in early 1991 rescued Itoman & Co., a significant Japanese trading firm
with massive property-related debts. Sumitomo ejected Itoman's top executive
and arranged to transfer most of Itoman's property-related debts to other par-
ties, including itself, better positioned to handle them. JACOBS, supra note 9, at
155-56.
56. See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
57. Ferguson, supra note 44, at 58.
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also combine monitoring and control functions in one actor: the
main bank.ss
The keiretsu structure in Japan is maintained through a sys-
tem of "cross-ownership" of stock.59 Each company within the
group generally owns from 0.5 to three percent of the stock of
the other members' firms.60 In the aggregate, the constituent
companies own a controlling stake in the other members'
firms,61 locking control within the group. The expectation of as-
sured long-term business relationships62 is strengthened by the
practice of using other companies in the same keiretsu as pre-
ferred suppliers.63 Keiretsu members tend to be more interested
58. Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and
Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 399, 400 (1989) (The author
notes that his analysis is only partial in that it deals with the relationship be-
tween large incorporated companies and financial institutions, and it cannot be
assumed that the same economic processes are necessarily at work in the small
and medium-sized firm sectors of the economy. Nor should it be overlooked
that the main bank system has been subject to pressures for change in recent
years as a result of deregulation and internationalization of the financial system
and structural changes in the economy).
59. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1295-96.
60. Id. Approximately 65 to 75% of the stock in all listed companies on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange is held in cross-ownership. Id. at 1296.
61. Id.
62. Lipton, supra note 47, at 219. See also Aron Viner, Mergers, Acquisi-
tions and Corporate Governance in Japan, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE, supra note 14, at 27, 28. ("The tightly woven web of shareholders
helps management give primary attention to long-term plans and decision mak-
ing, instead of pursuing short-term profits to satisfy the fleeting inclinations of
institutional investors.").
63. John C. Coffee, Comparative Corporate Governance, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26,
1992, at 5 [hereinafter Comparative Corporate Governance]. Rather than taking
bids, Japanese firms have one or two suppliers, which have target pricing. Ex-
perts Urge Enforcement, supra note 45, at 1663.
Japan's paper industry provides an example of the keiretsu system. A
study commissioned by the American Paper Institute (API) found that Japan's
major paper producers hold "significant" equity shares in the major Japanese
distributors, and have close ties to printers and other end users. Trade Policy:
Baucus Introduces Bill to Extend Super 301 Provision of 1988 Trade Act, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1525 (Oct. 23, 1991). Some major paper producers belong to
the same keiretsu, and some distributors obtain credit from their paper suppli-
ers. Id. The study found that there appeared to be close equity and lending
relationships between banks and paper suppliers and distributors. Id. Dana
Mead, representing API, testified that "[e]mpirical evidence demonstrates that
a distributor will often source paper from suppliers with whom it shares a prin-
cipal bank." Id.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission addressed the antitrust implications of
these practices when it said that "while the existence of keiretsu does not neces-
sarily violate antitrust laws, their way of doing business sometimes keeps for-
eign competitors out of the Japanese market." Japan: Government Agency
Lists Unfair Practices, Tries to Implement New Antitrust Measures, 7 Int'l
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in the continued strength of the group than in their own short-
term profits 4 because the members gain by receiving and pro-
viding preferential treatment6 to each other as preferred sup-
pliers and customers, not by being paid dividends.6 Because the
goal of the group is not to maximize share prices but to expand
market share in each of the various industries represented,67
member companies pressure each other to grow and coordinate
their planning.68 The mutual ownership interest leads keiretsu
members to ratify each other's management decisions when
challenged by outsiders, and rarely to take action which threat-
ens any group member.69
Approximately two-thirds of stocks listed on exchanges in
Japan are held by corporations and financial institutions. 70
Often the majority of shares in a corporation are collectively
owned by members of the same keiretsu.71 Individual stock-
holders own only about thirty percent of outstanding total equi-
ties of listed companies, and do not have an effective voice in the
corporate governance structure.72
Part of the explanation for the differences between the
American and Japanese systems rests in the reasons for which
they were developed. The American system protects share-
holder rights, and developed in response to the Great Depres-
Trade Rep. (BNA) 810 (June 6, 1990). Examples of keiretsu actions that violate
antitrust laws include the practice of powerful companies to threaten distribu-
tors not to handle the products of rival groups and forcing trade partners to buy
and hold their stock or demanding a stake in the smaller company as a condi-
tion for doing business. Id
64. M. Evan Corcoran, Foreign Investment and Corporate Control in Ja-
pan: T. Boone Pickens and Acquiring Control Through Share Ownership, 22
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 333, 347 (1991).
65. See supra note 63.
66. THUROW, supra note 16, at 134.
67. Id at 135.
68. Id
69. Corcoran, supra note 64, at 347. The process of cross-shareholding
lends stability to a corporation's planning, and reduces risk. PRESTOWITZ, supra
note 45, at 160.
70. Viner, supra note 62, at 27.
71. Lipton, supra note 47, at 219. Major Japanese firms have a quarter of
their stock controlled by large shareholders, compared to only one-twelfth of
the stock of American corporations. Roe, supra note 11, at 59-60. The percent-
age of stocks held by individuals in the United States fell from 71% in 1980 to
49.7% in 1992. Laderman, supra note 35, at 62. Since large shareholders have a
greater incentive to monitor the corporations in which they invest, the implica-
tion is that effective monitoring may occur more frequently in Japan than in
the United States.
72. Aoki, supra note 15, at 14.
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sion.73 In contrast, the Japanese system developed following
World War II as an effort by the government to actively en-
courage the rebuilding of industries.7 4 The system of cross-own-
ership was intended to help keep out foreign investment and
imports, and to allow scarce resources to be concentrated in in-
dustries which were deemed critical to Japan's long-term eco-
nomic security.75 The Japanese system was not designed to
protect the small shareholder; rather, it was designed to protect
the entire country or community, whose interests take prece-
dence over the short-term interests of individual consumers or
stockholders. 76
C. GERMANY
Corporate management in Germany is monitored by institu-
tional investors (predominantly banks, insurance companies and
investment funds), which are the main holders of shares in Ger-
many.77 Major German banks control corporations through a
proxy system by which shares in German corporations are de-
posited by their owners with the banks.78 Banks, as in-
termediaries, can vote the shares on behalf of the owners.7 9 This
proxy system allows German banks to exercise nearly thirty-
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
74. Ferguson, supra note 44, at 58. Ichiro Fujiwara, former vice-minister of
the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), made the
following comments on national strategies:
Let's take the case of the mainframe computer as an example. After
the war, Japanese business firms had to start from scratch. To survive,
they had to struggle with outmoded technology and meager capital to
fend off foreign competitors armed with computerized manufacturing
systems and management. No responsible government leaders, faced
with such a situation, would have sat on their hands and watched do-
mestic industries crushed under the juggernaut of foreign competition.
We had to help the domestic computer industry to get on its feet. Gov-
ernment leaders of other countries had done, and are still doing, the
same thing.
Ichiro Fujiwara, Forced Changes, Bus. TOKYO, Apr. 1987, at 28 (quoted in
THUROW, supra note 16, at 144.).
75. Ferguson, supra note 44, at 58.
76. Eckhouse, supra note 36, at C1.
77. Dirk Schmalenbach, Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, at 109.
78. See iUpton & Rosenblum, supra note 46, at 220. ("Voluntary delegation
of voting rights to portfolio-managing banks is the norm among private inves-
tors, except for major stockholders.").
79. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1303-04. See also Uipton & Rosenblum, supra
note 46, at 220. The law under which banks exercise the votes attached to the
shares for the shareholder is known as the Depotgesetz. Schmalenbach, supra
note 77, at 110.
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four percent of the total voting power in the top one-hundred
German corporations and more than fifty percent of the total
voting power in the ten largest companies.80 In addition, the
banks also own shares and often hold seats on corporate supervi-
sory boards, which adds to their power.8 '
Banks, therefore, have tremendous control at general meet-
ings. Often banks may hold more than fifty percent of the vot-
ing rights present at a particular shareholder meeting, an
amount which is not proportional to the economic share of such
banks in the companies concerned.8 2 Moreover, bank control is
concentrated - three banks control forty percent of the stock in
German corporations.8 3
German corporations are even more dependent on banks
than their Japanese counterparts for access to all forms of exter-
nal finance.8 4 Unlike banks in Japan and the United States,
German banks perform the Hausbank (house bank) function
which allows them to handle both commercial banking and se-
80. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1303.
81. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 46, at 220. See also Roe, supra note 11,
at 60. German banks own under 5% of the stock of the largest one hundred
German corporations. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1303. See also John Cable,
Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West
German Banks, 95 ECON. J. 118, 120 (1985). However, German banks can law-
fully hold up to 25% of the common stock of any non-banking firm. Buxbaum,
supra note 34, at 36. Deutsche Bank provides an example of banks holding
seats on corporate supervisory boards; its executives sit on over 400 such boards.
JACOBS, supra note 9, at 70.
82. Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 117. See supra notes 78-81 and accom-
panying text.
83. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 46, at 220. See also Schmalenbach,
supra note 77, at 110. For example:
[T]he Deutsche Bank directly owns ten percent or more of the shares
in seventy companies: twenty-eight percent of Germany's largest com-
pany, Daimler-Benz; ten percent of Europe's largest reinsurance com-
pany, Munich Rai; twenty-five percent of Europe's largest department-
store chain, Karstady; thirty percent of Germany's largest construction
company, Phillip Holzmann; and twenty-one percent of Europe's larg-
est sugar producer, Suzucker . . . [Moreover,] Deutsche Bank execu-
tives sit on four hundred corporate boards... the large universal banks
own ten to twenty-five percent of the shares in forty-eight of the larg-
est one hundred [industrial] firms, twenty to fifty percent of the shares
in forty-three others, and over fifty percent of the shares in nine of the
one hundred largest [industrial] firms.
THUROW, supra note 16, at 34.
84. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1302. Bank borrowing is the largest single
source of capital, and banks handle most new issues of marketable securities,
placing significant proportions of them with their customers. Cable, supra note
81, at 119.
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curities underwriting.8 5 Moreover, given the proxy mechanism
noted above, the bank may actually control a majority of the
firm's voting stock.86 Banks also play an important role by influ-
encing the occupancy of the firms' supervisory council in the
two-tiered corporate board structure8 7 required by the German
corporate legal system.88 Only Aktiengesellschaften (joint stock
companies) may be publicly listed in Germany.8 9 These joint
stock companies have a two-tiered management structure, com-
posed of the Vorstand (management board) and the A fsichtsrat
(supervisory board).9 0 The management board handles the day-
to-day running of the company, and the supervisory board over-
sees the management board, when necessary, and participates in
long-term strategic decisions.9 1 The shareholders appoint the
supervisory board, and the supervisory board appoints the man-
agement board. 92 Individual shareholders have limited influ-
ence under this system, and are powerless to alter its structure.93
There are several possible relationships between banks and
corporations in Germany, including: providing a range of com-
mercial and investment banking services (the Hausbank func-
tion); representing small shareholders under the proxy system;
sitting on the corporations's supervisory board; and owning a
substantial block of the corporation's stock.94 The banks, as
owners of shares, representatives of other shareholders, and
often lenders to the company,95 tend to exercise their power in
support of management.96 Banks, particularly in their role as
lenders, also prefer a long-term strategy which emphasizes the
85. Friedrich K. Kiibler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97, 103 (1991). See also Cable, supra note
81, at 119.
86. Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 36.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92. See also Cable, supra note 81,
at 125.
88. Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 37. German law requires that half the seats
on the supervisory board be given to labor and employee representatives. Cof-
fee, supra note 37, at 1315. Banks can influence the filling of positions (one-half
of the total) on the supervisory board that the law does not assign to employees.
Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 37. Banks can thus influence the choice of the CEO
and, indirectly, the composition of the Vorstand (managing board). Id.
89. Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 110.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Kiibler, supra note 85, at 103.
95. Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 111.
96. Id
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continued vitality of the company. 97 The banks are well-suited
to perform the monitoring function because the banks' ability to
control a majority of shares in most public companies allows
them to unilaterally remove directors if they wish.98 It is thus
cost effective and profitable for the banks to monitor corpora-
tions. Moreover, the banks, as corporate "insiders," have access
to detailed financial information about the corporation and its
long-range plans, thus reducing their risk of investment. The
result is that banks do not require corporations to produce con-
tinuous improvements in short-term earnings, and corporations
are able to make long-term decisions needed to maintain or in-
crease their competitiveness in the international marketplace.
The conditions under which the German system developed
help explain its dissimilarity to the American system. In close
parallel to Japan, the German economic system developed as an
important element of Germany's strategy to remain politically
and economically independent after World War II.99 Unlike cor-
porate governance in the United States, the government of Ger-
many, like that of Japan, was not interested in protecting the
individual shareholders, but in protecting the entire country.
II. REDUCING SHORT-TERMISM IN THE
UNITED STATES
Japanese and German banks are able to monitor and control
corporations to a much greater extent than are their American
counterparts. In the United States, the lack of shareholder par-
ticipation fails to provide the accountability necessary to ensure
that companies maximize their performance. 10 0 In contrast, the
Japanese combination of cross-shareholding and major share-
holdings by the corporation's lenders provides stability,1 1 a
long-term orientation,10 2 and insulation for Japanese corporate
management from the short-term pressures often experienced
by managers in the United States.10 3 Similarly, the German sys-
tem concentrates the control of shareholdings in a few leading
banks, which are capable of effective monitoring and are focused
on the long-term business health of the corporation.1° 4 This in-
97. IcL
98. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 70.
99. THUROW, supra note 16, at 38.
100. See JACOBS, supra note 9, at 63.
101. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 46, at 219.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 220 n.101.
104. Id at 220.
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sulation from short-term pressures allows corporate manage-
ment to build factories and to finance research and inventories
that lead to increased international competitiveness. In both
Germany and Japan, management is held accountable for its
performance by informed participants.
A. THE CAUSES OF SHORT-TERMISM
The following discussion examines how access to capital,
takeovers, and the prohibitive cost of corporate monitoring in
the United States place pressures on managers to pursue short-
term goals. This section concludes that bank ownership and
monitoring of corporations can effectively reduce pressures on
management to pursue short-term goals, allow for a longer-term
view, and increase international competitiveness.
1. Access to Capital
U.S. corporations generally lack the long-term, low-interest
capital to build factories and to finance research and inventories
that are necessary to increase their long-term competitive-
ness.10 5 This lack of access to capital in the United States re-
quires managers to pursue short-term strategies. Most U.S.
companies carry roughly thirty percent debt and seventy per-
cent equity.1 6 In contrast, in Japan most companies carry sev-
enty percent debt and thirty percent equity. 10 7 The difference
between debt and equity instruments dramatically affects the
cost of capital in two ways. First, because shareholders assume a
greater risk, they expect higher total returns on equity than in-
terest payments on debt instruments. 0 8 Second, in the United
States interest payments are deductible from taxes as a business
expense while payments to shareholders are not. 0 9
105. See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 7.
In 1990, Japanese businesses spent nearly a trillion dollars on fixed
capital formation - about a quarter of a trillion dollars more than was
spent on new capital equipment in the United States and more than
twice the amount spent on a per-worker basis .... The high rate of
investment gives the Japanese a major advantage in incorporating new
technology and upgrading products .... Fixed investment in Japan
accounted for 33% of gross national product, compared with about 14%
in the United States.
Japan: Japan's Vast Capital Investment Worsens US. Firms' Competitiveness,
Expert Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 663 (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Japan's
Vast Capital Investment].
106. PREsTowrrz, supra note 45, at 168.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id,
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U.S. corporations have less access to debt instruments than
their Japanese and German counterparts due to a lower con-
sumer savings rate and higher interest rates linked to the fed-
eral budget deficit." 0 A low savings rate in the United States
(approximately 4.2 percent in the last few months of 1992) 111 re-
sults in a shortage of capital, which allows investors to demand
high rates of return, and creates tremendous pressure for corpo-
rations to produce short-term profits.112 In Japan the rate of
savings is about eighteen percent, and is the result of deliberate
measures by the Japanese government to encourage savings.
113
Moreover, low interest rates for industries and high interest
rates for consumer loans are maintained in Japan." 4
In the United States, a significant source of capital for large
corporations is the stock market. If a company's profits fall be-
low expectations, even for a quarter, its share prices drop, thus
increasing the cost of its capital and its vulnerability to financial
raids.115 The high return demanded by U.S. investors explains
why dividend payments in the United States are higher than div-
idend payments in Japan or Germany. 116 In the United States,
eighty-two percent of after-tax profits were paid out to share-
holders as dividends in 1990.117 In contrast, in Japan, only thirty
percent of after-tax profits were paid out as dividends in 1990,118
110. See Karmel, supra note 34, at 71.
111. David R. Francis, U.S. Recovery Barely Gets Passing Grade, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1992, at 7. Others have placed the figure much lower.
See, e.g., Charles Paul Freund, Running on Empty: Campaign Speech-Making,
as if Reality Depended on It, WASH. POST, May 17, 1992, at C3 ("Our rate [of
savings] is 2.9 percent, the lowest in the industrialized world."). In the 1960s the
savings rate in the United States was 9.8, which fell to 3.6 percent in the 1980s.
George F. Will .. . And a Breathtaking Proposal, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1992, at
C7.
112. PRESTOWrrZ, supra note 45, at 208.
113. Id. at 126. These measures include tax-free postal savings accounts, no
consumer credit, the high cost of consumer goods, and a bonus-based salary sys-
tem. Id.
114. Id. at 126-27. Japan's Key Technology Center provides capital invest-
ment for cooperative research and interest-free loans for high-risk technologies.
Japan's Vast Capital Investment, supra note 105, at 663. Japanese firms are
also assisted by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
which runs sixteen national laboratories, many of which are established for the
purpose of assisting industry. Id.
115. PREsTOwITz, supra note 45, at 208.
116. See Karmel, supra note 34, at 71.
117. Thurow, supra note 16, at 126. In 1991, U.S. companies paid out 65% of
after-tax income as dividends. Robert J. Samuelson, Japan's Reckoning, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 1992, at A25.
118. THUROW, supra note 16, at 126. See also Coffee, supra note 37, at 1299.
("Japanese corporations historically have paid dividends equal only to approxi-
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and twenty-eight percent in 1991.119 Japanese companies are
able to pay low dividends because the shareholders, as members
of the company's keiretsu, gain by getting and giving preferen-
tial treatment to each other as preferred suppliers and custom-
ers, not by being paid dividends.1 2 ° This strategy, combined with
lower wages in Japan, leaves more capital in the corporation.12 1
As a result of a lack of access to low-cost capital for U.S. corpora-
tions, the corporations are investing less in long-term market
share, product development, and manufacturing technology in
order to achieve the improved short-term earnings demanded by
U.S. investors.
Finally, the "arms-length" relationship between banks and
corporations in the United States results in greater borrowing
risks (e.g., bankruptcy) than those found in Germany and Ja-
pan.122 Because banks in the United States do not serve as direc-
tors or shareholders, they have less access to sufficient
information about corporations and are often unaware of poten-
tial crises. 123 The result is that U.S. banks pursue a more con-
servative loan policy, lending significantly less than if more
detailed information was available.'2 By comparison, bank
ownership and monitoring in Japan and Germany results in
greater access to information; consequently, lenders in those
countries are more willing to renegotiate debt payments and ex-
tend new loans in times of distress. 2 5 Japanese and German
corporations are thus able to operate under significant debt
without increasing the risk of bankruptcy or compromising their
long-term strategies.12 6 This "flexible debt" is the product of
greater willingness on the part of banks and their customers to
mately ten percent of the par value of their stock, and dividend yields as a per-
centage of the market value of shares are much lower, usually between one and
two percent of market value. These figures would be extraordinarily low for
most U.S. corporations.").
119. Samuelson, supra note 117, at A25.
120. THuRow, supra note 16, at 134.
121. Id. at 126. Statistics show that more than $1 trillion was removed from
U.S. corporations over the past five years to pay for shareholder dividends and
for stock buyback programs undertaken to boost share prices and keep poten-
tially unfriendly shareholders happy. During the same period of time in Japan,
capital flowed the other direction, adding $200 billion to the pool available to
firms in Japan. Steven Pearlstein, Summit's Big Debate: Where Is a Dollar
Best Invested?, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at Fl.
122. See JACOBS, supra note 9, at 146, 147.
123. Id at 156.
124. Id.
125. I at 147.
126. Id.
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establish close relationships.'i 7 The mandatory "arms-length"
relationship between banks and corporations in the United
States makes it more difficult for corporations to obtain low-
cost, patient 128 investment capital in order to help develop com-
panies and entire industries.'- 9
2. Takeovers
Many investors view takeovers as an effective method of
monitoring corporate management. 3 0 Passive shareholders
who do not otherwise have an effective voice in corporate deci-
sions can "vote" to remove poor management by choosing to sell
their shares to corporate raiders when presented with a tender
offer,' 3 ' rather than by "voting" for management by holding
their shares.'3 2 The number of companies which were destroyed
or significantly altered by hostile takeovers in the 1980s, how-
ever, suggests that takeovers are a costly, ineffective, and short-
term method of monitoring corporations. 3 3 The threat of take-
overs provides an incentive for management to defend itself by
keeping share prices high in the short term, often at the expense
of long-term growth.'i 4 Share prices also determine the ability
of a business to raise additional capital.'3 5 High share prices
come at a cost, however. By focusing the attention of corpora-
tion management on striving to maintain consistent profits at
the expense of expanded research and development or new facil-
ities, anti-takeover measures affect the long-term strategic deci-
sions of management. In addition, the upheaval and expense
resulting from takeovers is largely unnecessary because the
problems companies face can often be solved by a change in
127. 1& Since the corporation's lenders in Japan and Germany are also its
shareholders and members of its economic group, the corporation has group
support, and it is unlikely that the loans will be called. The loans are safe be-
cause the group implicitly stands behind them. PRESTowrrz, supra note 45, at
169.
128. A "patient" investment strategy is one that involves marginal or no re-
turns early on but eventually provides substantial returns in the more distant
future. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 183.
129. Eckhouse, supra note 36, at C1.
130. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 10-11.
131. A tender offer is an offer to buy all or a portion of the shareholders'
shares. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 119.
132. See icl. at 120-21.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
134. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Invest-
ment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulations and for Corpo-
rate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 139-40 (1991).
135. Id
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management, rather than by a change in ownership.136
Although hostile takeovers are often justified as an appro-
priate corporate governance device in the United States,137 they
present problems of cost and efficiency. Takeovers not only in-
volve the opportunity costs discussed above, but also involve
enormous transaction costs, involving legal, advisory, and fi-
nancing fees.I -s By comparison, hostile takeovers in Germany
and Japan are extremely rare.139 This fact suggests that greater
bank involvement may relieve some of the inefficiencies inher-
ent in the market discipline system in the United States.
In Japan, keiretsu and cross-shareholding have created a
system in which a large proportion of the equities held by banks
and other corporate entities remains constant.140 The managers
of Japanese firms are insulated from takeover raids, and can
conduct business without building defenses which could pre-
clude the accumulation of equity or inhibit long-term research
and development strategies.' 4 ' As one author noted, "[t]o
lengthen time horizons and accept a lower rate of return, impa-
136. Jonathan Charkham, The American Corporation and the Institutional
Investor: Are There Lessons from Abroad?Hands Across the Sea, 1988 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 765, 769 (1988).
137. Karmel, supra note 34, at 63.
138. "In a typical leveraged buyout in the 1980s, the legal, advisory, and fi-
nancing fees averaged approximately 4 percent of the purchase price of the
company, and more than 5 percent of the prevailing market value at the time of
the offer." JACOBS, supra note 9, at 115.
139. See Viner, supra note 62, at 27; Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 111;
and JACOBS, supra note 9, at 115.
140. Aoki, supra note 15, at 14. Individual stockholders own only approxi-
mately 30% of outstanding total equities of list companies, and do not have an
effective voice in the corporate governance structure. Id. Stable cross-share-
holding is the primary takeover defense of Japanese corporations. Viner, supra
note 62, at 28. By law, merger or acquisition is possible only with consent of all
company directors, the vast majority of which are career employees. Id. at 29.
See also Aoki, supra note 15, at 14. Cf. Sheard, supra note 58, at 408-09. How-
ever, Aron Viner argues that the incidence of takeovers in Japan, including hos-
tile ones, is going to rise sharply for three reasons: (1) an increasing number of
foreign firms are purchasing blocks of shares in Japanese corporations; (2) Ja-
pan's cross-shareholding system will be forced to be dismantled by the scrutiny
of foreign investors demanding full reciprocity in the Japanese financial mar-
kets; (3) the Japanese courts have proclaimed that shareholders are investors
whose interests need to be protected. Viner, supra note 62, at 31.
141. Viner, supra note 62, at 27. The efforts of takeover specialist T. Boone
Pickens to obtain seats on the board of directors of Koito Manufacturing Co., a
Japanese auto parts manufacturer, highlight the stability of the Japanese sys-
tem. Picken's firm, Boone Co., holds a 26.4% share in Koito, and is its largest
shareholder. Japan: Koito Shareholders Veto Pickens' Proposals, Say 'No' to
Board Seats at Annual Meeting, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 998 (July 4, 1990).
Pickens' bid for four seats on the Koito board was rejected, however, even
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tient consumption-oriented stockholders must be kept under
control. The Japanese or German business groups have been or-
ganized to do just that."142 In Germany, like Japan, the struc-
ture of shareholdings effectively reduces (if not eliminates) the
pressure on management to avoid takeovers, because the voting
power is concentrated in the hands of the banks.143 As a result,
in both Japan and Germany corporate management is able to
concentrate on developing new products, reducing costs, and
penetrating new markets, rather than maximizing share
prices.'"
3. Monitoring Costs
Individual shareholders in the United States have little in-
centive to monitor corporations. Shareholders rarely hold large
blocks of stock, limiting their ability (and willingness) to exert
control or express opinions in relation to the management of the
corporation. 145 Moreover, shareholders do not have access to ad-
equate information to make informed decisions about long-term
investing.146 Shareholders do not become aware of problems
within the corporation in time to correct them, and are power-
less to correct the problems they are aware of. 147 Shareholders
obtain much of their corporate information from reported earn-
ings, which fail to explain the merits of long-term expenses. 148
The emphasis of U.S. investors on short-term earnings results in
much greater research and development expenses for U.S. cor-
porations, and their long-term international competitiveness
suffers. 149 The market mechanism of hostile takeovers provides
at least one form of monitoring, but it is a highly expensive and
though Toyota Motor Corp., Koito's second largest stockholder with a 19.1%
stake, already holds three seats. Id
142. THURow, supra note 16, at 134. For example, Japan maintains low in-
terest rates for industries, and high interest rates for consumer loans.
PRESTowrrz, supra note 45, at 126-27.
143. See also Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 111. In both Japan and Ger-
many, management is free of the temptation to fashion "golden parachutes"
(executive termination agreements between corporations and their executive
personnel guaranteeing general severance benefits in the event of a corporate
takeover) for protection against being fired following a takeover. PRESTOWITZ,
supra note 45, at 156.
144. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 45, at 156.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
146. Hazen, supra note 134, at 142.
147. Id
148. See JACOBS, supra note 9, at 36.
149. See id.
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inefficient one. 15°
In addition to increasing the cost of monitoring, the paucity
of information and prohibitive cost of obtaining it leads to
greater market uncertainty. Inadequate corporate information
results in greater risk to the investor, which generally increases
the cost of capital and requires a corporation to produce short-
term profits. Greater uncertainty can also result in attempts by
management to defend against perceived takeover threats, and
bank unwillingness to lend large amounts of capital.' 51
In Japan and Germany, the shareholders are large and sta-
ble enough to monitor the corporations effectively. 52 In Japan,
the monitoring bank holds a significant stake in the firm as a
shareholder, and is also the bank with the largest loan share. 53
Such a significant interest often means that it is cost-effective
and profitable for the bank to monitor the corporation closely.154
Moreover, the bank's involvement in the business and financial
plans of the firm, and its access to regular reports of firm per-
formance,155 lead to a close information-sharing system.' 56 The
bank, as the major cash manager-creditor-stockholder, 157 is able
to detect problems of declining profits at a very early stage.' 58
The Japanese banks, unlike the individual shareholders in the
United States, are able to obtain inside access to the firm. This
access allows them to obtain information about the firm and its
management which is not readily available, or available only at
high cost to the external capital market.
Similarly, in Germany, bank borrowing is the largest exter-
nal source of finance for corporations. 159 Banks also handle
most new issues of marketable securities, provide advisory and
brokerage services in securing foreign, government and non-
bank loans, and are widely represented on supervisory boards.16°
150. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
152. See generally Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 46, at 219-21.
153. Sheard, supra note 58, at 406.
154. See id.
155. Id at 403. This process of information exchange is often formalized by
the main bank having a director link with the firm or through membership of a
"presidents' club" in which the bank and other affiliated firms participate. Id
156. Id.
157. Aoki, supra note 15, at 15 n.7.
158. The information is often gained from the management of commercial
accounts, and long-term personal contacts with top management of the com-
pany and its business partners. Id, at 15.
159. Cable, supra note 81, at 119.
160. Id,
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Industry reliance on the banking system for access to capital and
services results in substantial flow of information about corpo-
rate plans and performance to the banks.161
4. Institutional Investors
Some would argue that non-bank institutional investors
should be able to provide the large, stable, long-term investment
strategies in the United States which banks have provided in
Germany and Japan. However, although institutional investors
hold large portions of all publicly traded U.S. shares,162 they
have not actively assumed the monitoring function.'6 Indeed,
the Business Roundtable'6 4 argued that "[u]nless institutional
investors develop the ability to analyze and understand the long-
term competitive performance of the companies in which
they've invested, it's hard to see how their involvement in corpo-
rate governance will have a positive effect on corporate perform-
ance or U.S. competitiveness."'16 5 Institutional investors have
consistently engaged in passive short-term investment strate-
gies, such as indexing,'6 the use of derivative products, and pro-
gram trading.167 Much of this is the result of legal restraints; 6 8
however, it has been argued that even in the absence of legal
restrictions, institutional investors would only moderately in-
161. Id.
162. "In 1980, institutions held 33 percent of all publicly quoted American
shares. [In 1991].... they are believed to own 45 percent." Karmel, supra note
34, at 68. "By the end of 1989, pension funds owned an estimated 25-40 percent
of publicly traded equities and they could own 50 percent by the year 2000." 1&
In 1989, institutions held 50 percent of the stock in the top fifty public
corporations, 56.5 percent in the top 51-100 and 54.2 percent in the top
101-250. Moreover, institutional assets are heavily concentrated. At
the end of 1988, the top thirty public and private pension funds held
approximately 27.3 percent of the asset value of all such funds and 39.6
percent of the assets of the thousand largest funds.
Id- The largest class of institutional investors, pension funds, owned roughly
44% of all institutional holdings in 1987. Matheson & Olson, supra note 34, at
1355.
163. See Karmel, supra note 34, at 69.
164. The Business Roundtable is a business lobbying group which repre-
sents a group of two hundred chief executives from the nation's largest
companies.
165. Karmel, supra note 34, at 85. (quoting Letter from H.B. Atwater, Jr.,
Chairman, Task Force on Corporate Governance, The Business Roundtable, to
Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC (Dec. 17,
1990)).
166. Indexes are portfolios of stock designed to mirror the performance of
certain stock indices. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at 54.
167. Karmel, supra note 34, at 69. See also Hazen, supra note 134, at 137-39.
168. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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crease their participation in corporate governance. 16 9
There are several possible reasons for the lack of participa-
tion by many institutional investors. First, many institutional
investors have adopted the practice of indexing, by which the
investor holds a portfolio of stock designed to mirror the per-
formance of certain stock indices, guaranteeing that they will do
no worse and no better than average.170 Although this strategy
may provide for longer-term investments, it fails to provide an
economic incentive for investors to monitor corporations be-
cause investors are "guaranteed" to do no better or worse than
average. 171 Additionally, institutional investors do not have the
resources necessary to monitor the large number of companies
they own through an index fund.172
Ownership behavior by institutional investors is also re-
stricted by the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), a provi-
sion of the tax code which stipulates that if an institutional
investor actively engages in providing direction to a company in
which it owns stock, it may be entering that business.173 This is
significant, because "engaging in a business" could expose the
institutional investor to tax liability on that investment.174
Conflicts of interest may also arise, leading to a short-term
strategy of voting pro-management even when doing so is likely
to decrease company value. 175 For example, money managers
who vote against a company's proposals and develop an "anti-
169. Comparative Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 7. Other authors
disagree, arguing that the dual position of many institutional investors as both
bondholder and stockholder presents the kind of short-term conflict that could
make them effective monitors. See Karmel, supra note 34, at 94-95. A few of
the explanations for the lack of corporate monitoring by institutional investors
are examined in the text below. See also Coffee, supra note 37, at 1317-28.
170. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 54. See also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 64-
65. Approximately one-third of all equity investments held by institutional
funds are indexed. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1339.
171. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 55. "[Tlhere is no economic incentive to par-
ticipate in corporate governance, learn a company's strategy, or vote their prox-
ies. With indexing, investment dollars are spread so thinly across a large
number of companies that improving the performance of a few would hardly
influence their overall return." Id
172. Id There is also a "free-rider" problem: the institution would use time
and resources to pursue a result that would benefit others as much as or more
than itself, and the institution bears the entire risk of loss if the effort fails.
Sommer, supra note 33, at 370.
173. 26 U.S.C. § 512 (1988); JACOBS, supra note 9, at 49.
174. "Pension funds guard their tax-exempt status carefully and avoid any
action that could be deemed taxable." JACOBS, supra note 9, at 49.
175. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu-
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 826 (1992).
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manager" reputation risk losing business with that company or
may find it harder to gain new business.176
Monthly and quarterly performance reports promote short-
termism by focusing the investor's attention on immediate gains
rather than on long-term goals.177 The compensation and con-
tinued employment of institutional investment managers are
often linked closely with the performance of the plan, giving the
managers of the plan incentive to use short-term strategies. 17
Finally, fund managers are actually given incentives to max-
imize their short-term profits.179 Boards of directors are re-
quired to consider takeover bids that raise share prices in the
short term, even if they could harm the company in the long-
term.
8 0
Despite the impact of legal rules, conflicts of interest, and
other obstacles, a few institutional investors are beginning to be-
come more involved in the monitoring process.' 8 ' Although
proxy fights by institutional investors are still rare, some institu-
tional investors now vote against management proposals on gov-
176. Id, Surveys indicate that institutions support management proposals
between 59 and 74% of the time. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1293. For example,
Dean LeBaron of the investment management firm Batterymarch has lost as-
sets in part because of corporate displeasure with LeBaron's consistent opposi-
tion to anti-takeover measures put in by companies. Brett D. Fromson, The Big
Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 67.
177. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 50. Some market professionals argue that mu-
tual fund managers are more short-term oriented than pension fund managers
because pension fund managers report their returns quarterly while mutual
fund managers' results are in the newspapers every day. Laderman & Smith,
supra note 35, at 63-64.
178. PRESTOwrrz, supra note 45, at 209-10. The Securities and Exchange
Commission requires quarterly reporting of profits, while Japan requires only
semi-annual reports. Id Investment advisers for mutual funds and pensions
are compensated only by a small annual percentage of the assets under their
control. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1362-63. Compensation based on capital ap-
preciation would provide more of an incentive for advisers to monitor, but the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits the use of any formula that "provides
for compensation to the investment adviser on the basis of a share of capital
gains upon or capital appreciation to the funds or any portion of the funds of the
client." Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1)
(1988). See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1363 n.337.
179. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 45, at 210.
180. I&
181. One reason for this new activism is that institutional investors increas-
ingly own large unmarketable blocks of stock and must accept substantial price
discounts in order to liquidate those blocks. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1288-89.
As a result, some institutional investors are choosing to become involved in gov-
ernance decisions rather than sell their stock. I&. at 1289. For an examination
of corporate managements' reaction to increasing institutional activism, see
Terence P. Pare, Two C7zeers for Pushy Investors, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 95.
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ernance issues.'8 2 In 1989, institutional investors presented 215
governance proposals. As of August 1990, 285 governance pro-
posals had been presented for the year. 83 The number of insti-
tutional representatives that sit on corporate boards is
growing.184 The California Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem (CalPERS) and Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway are
notable examples of monitoring efforts by institutional inves-
tors. CalPERS has been willing to commit substantial capital to
policing the performance of some companies in its index.185 As
of late 1989, CalPERS had sponsored twenty-eight shareholder
proposals and has sought to reform the proxy rules.186 Simi-
larly, Berkshire Hathaway purchased large stakes in a number
of companies, and Buffett took over as CEO of Salomon Broth-
ers after a scandal forced the former CEO to resign. 8 7
Nevertheless, institutional investors, for the most part, have
not been able to provide the stable, long-term investment strate-
gies in the United States which banks have provided in Germany
and Japan. Even though institutional investors are large enough
to monitor corporations in a cost-effective manner, legal rules
and conflicts of interest prevent them from mitigating their risk
of investment by obtaining adequate information about the cor-
poration and its long-range plans. As a result, most institutional
investors, like individuals, require corporations to produce in-
creasing short-term earnings at the expense of long-term
growth.
182. Black, supra note 175, at 814.
183. Matheson & Olson, supra note 34, at 1357.
184. Black, supra note 175, at 829. "Robert Kurby of Capital Guardian Trust
and Frank Savage of Equitable Capital Management were appointed to the
Lockheed board to fulfill Lockheed's promise, made during a 1990 proxy fight,
to appoint institutional representatives. In 1991, Tiger Management won a
proxy fight to appoint five directors to the board of Cleveland-Cliffs." Id.
185. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 55. CalPERS, one of the nation's largest insti-
tutional investors, invests pension funds for more than 950,000 public employ-
ees throughout California and has assets valued at approximately $71 billion.
Lawrence M. Fisher, Big Pension Fund Prodding 12 Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1993, § 1, at 36. At Honeywell, CalPERS and the Pennsylvania Public
Schools Employees' Retirement System helped launch a proxy battle that led
management to restructure the company, with highly successful results. From-
son, supra note 176, at 67. CalPERS is the exception, and Executive Director
Dale Hanson admits that his fund gets involved only in the case of consistent
underperformers. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 55.
186. Coffee, supra note 37, at 1293 n.56. "In November 1989 CalPERS sub-
mitted forty-eight proposals to the SEC for modifying its proxy rules." Som-
mer, supra note 33, at 374.
187. Black, supra note 175, at 846.
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B. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: THE MODIFICATION OR REPEAL OF
GLASS-STEAGALL
Having concluded that bank ownership and monitoring of
corporations in Japan and Germany reduces pressures on man-
agers to pursue short-term strategies, this Note now turns to the
future of bank monitoring of corporations in the United States.
More specifically, this section examines recent proposals to mod-
ify or repeal certain provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, dis-
cusses the existence of continuing safeguards which are
necessary to ensure the continuing stability of the banking in-
dustry, and considers political and cultural factors which may
affect the feasibility of modifying or repealing the Glass-Steagall
Act.
1. Proposed Banking Reforms
Legislators in both the United States House of Representa-
tives and Senate have recently introduced bills proposing the re-
peal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Even more clearly than the
regulations and interpretations of the Glass Steagall Act dis-
cussed below, 88 these proposed reforms suggest that bank own-
ership and monitoring of corporations may, in the future, be
available in the United States. The Comprehensive Deposit In-
surance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991189 con-
tained provisions to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.19° Before
consideration of the legislation by the Senate, however, the pro-
vision was eliminated. 191 Similarly, the Financial Institutions
Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991192 included provisions
to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act along with provisions to amend
the Bank Holding Company Act. Significantly, the House Com-
mittee noted that it had not been persuaded to repeal Glass-
Steagall because it believed that the securities industry had suf-
ficient excess capacity to enhance the profitability of the bank-
ing industry.193 Rather, the Committee determined that: (1)
most of Glass-Steagall had been administratively repealed al-
ready; (2) product innovations and technological advances had
rendered an absolute separation between commercial and in-
188. See infra text accompanying notes 199-204.
189. S. 543, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. Title VII (1991).
190. 137 CONG. REC. S17341-01, S17375 (1991) (remarks by Mr. Garn).
191. 1&
192. H.R. 6, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
193. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991. H.R.
REP. No. 157 (IV), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1991).
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vestment banking functionally impracticable; and (3) other ef-
fective safeguards strong enough to protect the public against
the evils Glass-Steagall sought to abate could be fashioned and
enforced. 194 The full House of Representatives defeated the bill
on November 4, 1991.195
These proposals, combined with several new bills intro-
duced in Congress in 1992,196 indicate a movement toward sub-
stantial banking reform. These reforms may have a significant
effect on the ability of banks to own and monitor corporations in
the future.
2. Effective Safeguards Remain
As noted earlier, the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in re-
sponse to congressional concerns that the largely unregulated
actions of banks after the stock market collapse and during the
Great Depression led to conflicts of interest, fraud, and the fail-
ure of many banks. 197 Any proposal suggesting the modification
or repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, therefore, must address the
effect of that modification or repeal on the continued stability of
the banking system. There are several reasons to believe that
modifying or repealing Glass-Steagall will not increase risk and
bank abuse.
First, the separation of commercial and investment banking
is so riddled with exceptions that it is difficult to support the
contention that eliminating the remaining restrictions would se-
riously imperil the banking system.198 Although Congress has
not amended or repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, federal and
state regulators have significantly expanded the scope of bank
power.' "9 In 1977, federal bank regulators interpreted Glass-
Steagall as permitting banks to serve as agents with respect to
the private placement of securities. 2°° In 1985, banks were per-
mitted to serve as advisers to open-end mutual funds, provide
advice to bank customers about a fund, and obtain commissions
194. Md
195. H.R. REP. No. 455, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 79 (1992).
196. 139 CONG. REC. E2877-02, E2878 (1992) (remarks by Hon. Peter Hoag-
land of Nebraska). House Bill No. 6087 would permit national banks, state
member banks, and bank holding companies to establish subsidiaries which un-
derwrite shares of and sponsor investment companies. H.R. 6087, 102nd Cong.,
1st. Sess. (1991). Senate Bill No. 696 and House Bill 1480 would amend the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. S. 696, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
197. See supra text accompaying notes 16-22.
198. See Tavelman, supra note 19, at 1511.
199. Id
200. Id
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from the mutual funds in whose shares a bank customer in-
vested.20 1 In 1987, national banks were given the authority to
underwrite and deal in interests in certain securities.20 2 In Sep-
tember 1990, for example, J.P. Morgan & Co. was granted per-
mission to underwrite and deal in corporate stocks through a
non-bank subsidiary.20 3 In January 1991, three additional banks
were granted the power to underwrite and deal in equity securi-
ties.2°4 These regulations and interpretations have significantly
relaxed the original provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act.
More importantly, activities permitted under Glass-Steagall
today are arguably no more risky than those currently prohib-
ited by the Act.205 In fact, most recent bank troubles have arisen
from such traditional banking activities as real estate loans, en-
ergy loans, and loans to developing countries, not from securities
transactions.2 6 Finally, any risky behavior by banks can be con-
strained by proper regulatory oversight and by the banks' desire
to maintain a favorable reputation in the financial markets.
3. Additional Considerations
In anticipating potential criticisms to a proposal advocating
an increase in the ability of U.S. banks to own stock and monitor
corporations, a few points are worth noting. First, the control of
the keiretsu system in Japan and that of the bank-centered sys-
tem in Germany appears to be decreasing. 20 7 In Japan, some of
the larger companies are starting to secure capital from the in-
ternational capital markets, thus circumventing their banks.208
In addition, the ratio of intra-group transactions is declining.20 9
201. Id
202. Id. This decision was upheld by the Second Circuit in Securities Indus-
try Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 2830, 100 L.Ed.2d 931 (1988).
203. See J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. (order of Jan. 18, 1989), 52 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 181 (Jan. 23, 1989).
204. Bankers Trust New York Corp., Canadian Imperial Bank of Com-
merce, and The Royal Bank of Canada. H.R. REP. No. 157 (IV), 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 101 (1991)
205. For example, Glass-Steagall restrictions do not restrict banks from sell-
ing mutual funds. See Leslie Wayne, Banks Venture into Mutual Fund Terri-
tory, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 31, 1992, at 1.
206. Tavelman, supra note 19, at 1511 (citing Stephen J. Friedman & Connie
M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to
There, 43 MD. L. REv. 413, 451 (1984)).
207. Comparative Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 7.
208. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 150.
209. Antitrust JFTC Study Finds Keiretsu Growing Weaker in Japan, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 764 (Apr. 29, 1992). The Japan Fair Trade Commission
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In Germany, the equity held by German banks in major corpora-
tions has been steadily decreasing.2 10 Consequently, banks hold
fewer board seats, and are less inclined to incur monitoring ex-
penses.2 1 ' Rather than proving conclusively that bank monitor-
ing is undesirable, these changes indicate that as international
credit markets have become available, some Japanese and Ger-
man corporations are willing to trade security for lower rates.2 12
Second, there is a significant structural difference in the
number of companies listed on stock exchanges in Germany and
those in the United States.213 In Germany, most companies are
privately held, and only about seven hundred of the three hun-
dred and eighty thousand companies in Germany are listed on a
public stock exchange.214 Owners and managers of privately
owned companies do not suffer from the same conflicts of inter-
est that exist between owners and managers of publicly held cor-
porations, because they are often one and the same.2 15 This
Note does not suggest that the German and Japanese systems
can be brought to the United States in their current form;
rather, it suggests that the Japanese and German corporate gov-
ernance systems, although structurally different than that of the
(JFTC) conducted a study of six Japanese keiretsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo) and found that the average ratio
of intra-group stock holdings per group firm is decreasing, that personnel rela-
tions between firms is declining, and that average intra-group transaction vol-
ume is falling. Id The study concluded, however, that the six keiretsu retain a
significant position in the Japanese economy. Id Congressional Research Ser-
vice's Dick Nanto said that "[t]he conglomerate keiretsu is likely to grow rather
than to shrink, although coordination among member companies is likely to
diminish as individual companies become more independent and networking
outside the keiretsu system becomes more common." Japan: Japan Not Likely
to Overtake U.S. Economy, But U.S. Not Meeting Challenge, Experts Say, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1582 (Oct. 17, 1990). On March 11, 1992, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. announced that it would unravel its keiretsu ties with retailers,
the first Japanese firm to do so. Japan: Matsushita Electric Becomes First Jap-
anese Firm to Break Keiretsu Ties, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 493 (Mar. 18, 1992).
The move was prompted by stricter anti-monopoly guidelines in Japan. Id
210. Comparative Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 7.
211. Id,
212. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 150. See also Comparative Corporate Govern-
ance, supra note 63, at 7. See also Coffee, supra note 37, at 1305-06.
213. By the end of 1988 only 706 of the approximately 380,000 German com-
panies were listed on any of the eight German stock exchanges. Of these 706
companies, only some 50 have a significant weight in the market.
Schmalenbach, supra note 77, at 109. "[A]pproximately eight thousand Ameri-
can firms are available candidates for institutional investment over public share
exchanges as against, at the most, eighty German firms." Buxbaum, supra note
34, at 18.
214. JACOBS, supra note 9, at 69.
215. Id
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United States, may illustrate useful elements for those inter-
ested in leading U.S. corporations to an increasingly competitive,
longer-term view of investment.
Third, increased institutional investment and bank monitor-
ing may lead to violations of insider trading and antitrust provi-
sions.2 16 However, given the heavy civil and criminal sanctions
against such actions,217 strong SEC and stock exchange enforce-
ment efforts, and the interest of institutional investors in avoid-
ing adverse publicity, the institutional investor has little
incentive to violate these provisions.218 Moreover, the risk of in-
sider trading and collusion is controllable through the use of
outsiders to fill board seats, decreasing the risks of insider trad-
ing and possible conflicts of interest.219
Finally, there are significant political and cultural differ-
ences between the United States, Japan, and Germany which
may impact the feasibility of modifying or repealing the Glass-
Steagall Act. In the United States, "[t]he individual is king and
government exists to keep corporations from harming the con-
sumer."220 The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act may be undesir-
able to those who highly value individual freedom because it
may, to a large extent, freeze individual investors out of corpo-
rate ownership. In addition, even if individual shareholders still
have access to corporate ownership, the powerful interests of the
bank may override those of the individual shareholders. Even
given these concerns, it is clear that there is a strong movement
216. Antitrust violations are a concern because a large stockholder who
owns stock in competing companies could facilitate price fixing, or other collu-
sive behavior. Black, supra note 175, at 870.
217. If found in violation of insider trading regulations, an institution could
be liable for compensatory damages to contemporaneous traders and to the SEC
for a civil penalty of up to three times its profits. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 20(a), 21(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(a), 78u(a) (1988). See also Coffee, supra
note 37, at 1345 n.259.
218. Black, supra note 175, at 868-69.
219. Id
220. Eckhouse, supra note 36, at Cl. This system is often described as indi-
vidualistic, finance or consumer capitalism. Id Corporate governance in
America protects shareholders' rights to a firm's ongoing earnings and residual
value, while the interests of other participants (e.g., suppliers, customers, em-
ployees and creditors) are not as directly protected by this process. Compara-
tive Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 6. Adversarial relations between
government and the private sector are deeply imbedded in American history.
THURow, supra note 16, at 38-39. See also Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 29.
("This drive [for profit maximization] . .. takes place, at least in the United
States, within a cultural frame of reference that sees labor and capital as antag-
onistic competitors.").
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III. CONCLUSION
The corporate governance model of bank ownership and
monitoring offered by Japan and Germany may be of great util-
ity in modifying the current system of corporate governance in
the United States. The Japanese and German corporate govern-
ance systems appear to be more suitable to a competitive inter-
national marketplace than the model of accountability by
managers and directors to stockholders that currently prevails
in the United States. Pressures on managers in the United
States to pursue short-term goals jeopardize international com-
petitiveness by making research and development and the build-
ing of new facilities prohibitively costly. The foregoing
discussion suggests that a modification or repeal of Glass-Stea-
gall, allowing banks to own stock in and monitor corporations,
decreases the cost of capital for investment by reducing risk and
increasing the amount of information available to the investor.
This, in turn, will lead to long-term international competitive-
ness. The decreasing power of banks in Japan and Germany,
however, leads to the conclusion that bank monitoring alone is
not the answer. Rather, as international capital markets gradu-
ally supersede internal capital markets, bank control will inevi-
tably be weakened. Therefore, the repeal or modification of the
Glass-Steagall Act should be accompanied by modifications to
provisions limiting the ability of other institutional investors to
own stock in and monitor corporations. Banks and other institu-
tional investors in the United States have the capability to be
effective monitors, they simply lack the legal ability.
221. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S17341-01, S17376-17377 (1991) (Letter from
more than 70 companies and users of financial services to Senator Garn of the
Banking Committee, urging the repeal of Glass-Steagall).
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